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Introduction

To "Secure America’s Promise as a Nation of Immigrants,"1 in 2002,
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
engineered a new procedure requiring all applicants for U.S. citizenship to
undergo an enhanced Federal Bureau of Investigation background name
check (FBI name check).2 Six years later, despite the stated aims of this
procedure—"enhanc[ing] national security"3 and maintaining the "integrity
of the immigration system"4—its implementation spawned two
problems: (1) a massive backlog of hundreds of thousands of applications5
and (2) allegations of racial discrimination against individuals of Muslim,
Arab, Middle Eastern, and South Asian descent.6
1. EDUARDO AGUIRRE JR., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., USCIS STRATEGIC PLAN: SECURING AMERICA’S PROMISE 1 (2005),
http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/USCISSTRATEGICPLAN.pdf.
2. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., A REVIEW OF U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. ALIEN SECURITY CHECKS 3–4 (2005),
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_06-06_Nov05.pdf (noting the newly formed
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ first goal was to "ensure the security and
integrity of the immigration system" by instituting FBI name checks); see also The Post-9/11
Visa Reforms and New Technology: Achieving the Necessary Security Improvements in a
Global Environment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Operations & Terrorism of the
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. 14–20 (2003) (statement by David Hardy, Acting
Assistant Director, Records Management Div., Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_senate_hear
ings&docid=f:92725.pdf (describing the FBI name check process); see generally FBI,
National Name Check Program, http://www.fbi.gov/hq/nationalnamecheck.htm (last visited
Feb. 5, 2010) ("The National Name Check Program’s (NNCP’s) mission is to disseminate
information from FBI files in response to name check requests received from federal
agencies . . . [and] to determine whether a specific individual has been the subject of or
mentioned in any FBI investigation(s).") (alteration in original) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
3. CITIZENSHIP AND NATURALIZATION SERVS. OMBUDSMAN, DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 4 (2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOMB
_Annual_Report_2007.pdf [hereinafter CIS 2007 REPORT].
4. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
RESPONSE TO THE CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES. OMBUDSMAN’S 2007 ANNUAL
REPORT 7 (2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/USCISO_Thematic_Response_2007_
FINAL_OMB_cleared.pdf [hereinafter RESPONSE TO CIS 2007 REPORT].
5. CIS 2007 REPORT, supra note 3, at 11–20; see also RESPONSE TO CIS 2007
REPORT, supra note 4, at 2–4 (discussing the backlog problem and its future impact on
immigration).
6. See, e.g., CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, NEW YORK UNIV. SCH. OF
LAW, IRREVERSIBLE CONSEQUENCES: RACIAL PROFILING AND LETHAL FORCE IN THE "WAR
TERROR"
18
(2006),
http://www.chrgj.org/docs/CHRGJ%20Irreversible%20
ON
Consequences%20June%202006.pdf ("Profiling of Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians has
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As the former Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (CIS
Ombudsman) noted in January 2008, this backlog crisis has become so
severe that it now "may be the single biggest obstacle to the timely and
efficient delivery of immigration benefits."7
The empirical data
demonstrates the severity of this problem.8 In 2007, the delayed
applications surged to more than 93,359, which resulted in a total of
329,160 individuals experiencing significant naturalization delays.9 The
overall numbers of processed applications skyrocketed.10 In addition to the
surge in backlogged applicants, the USCIS collectively processed more
than 1.3 million applications, with the numbers in March 2007 increasing
by more than sixty-four percent from September 2006.11
This surge has resulted in a dramatic increase in the number of federal
lawsuits filed to compel the USCIS to resolve these delays.12 The federal
courts continue to grapple with the legality of the FBI name check
procedures.13 Although this area of law remains unsettled, non-citizens
increased dramatically in the U.S. and elsewhere since . . . September 11, 2001, with
widespread reports of prejudice, harassment and attacks."); see also AMNESTY INT’L,
THREAT AND HUMILIATION: RACIAL PROFILING, DOMESTIC SECURITY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (2004), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/racial_profiling/
report/rp_report.pdf (noting the expansion in a number of groups frequently targeted by
racial profiling); see also Karen C. Tumlin, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy Is
Reshaping Immigration Policy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1173, 1177, 1227–37 (2004) (noting the
need to "assess the spillover effects that terrorism policy is having on our national immigrant
and immigration policy as well as on immigrants—both those here and those waiting to
come," and further analyzing how terrorism policy has shaped immigration policy since
September 11, 2001).
7. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS. OMBUDSMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
CISOMB_Annual_Report_2007.pdf.
8. See id. ("As of May 2007, USCIS reported 329,160 FBI name check cases
pending; [a]pproximately 64% (211,341) of those cases have been pending more than 90
days and approximately 32% (106,738) have been pending more than one year.").
9. Id.; see also CIS 2007 REPORT, supra note 3, at 14 (itemizing the most recent data
on overall immigration patterns across the United States for 2007).
10. See CIS 2007 REPORT, supra note 3, at 14 (finding 1,316,740 "pending
applications not included in ‘Backlog’").
11. See id. (noting 1,237,823 "pending applications not included in ‘Backlog’" in
September 2006 and 1,316,740 "pending applications not included in ‘Backlog’" in March
2007, which is approximately a sixty-four percent increase).
12. See THE AM. IMMIGR. L. FOUND., http://www.ailf.org/lac/ clearing
house_mandamus.shtml (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) [hereinafter Recent Mandamus Litigation]
(citing to and explaining the numerous FBI name check delay cases canvassing the United
States) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
13. See Memorandum from Michael Aytes, Assoc. Dir., Domestic Operations, U.S.
Citizen and Immigration Servs. on Revised Nat’l Sec. Adjudication & Reporting
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continue to rely exclusively on domestic statutes to effectuate naturalization
and to challenge the immigration system.14 What federal courts have yet to
consider is the possibility that these delays may implicate the United States’
obligations under international law.15 A report prepared by the Center for
Human Rights and Global Justice at New York University School of Law
(NYU Report)16 raised this issue in April 2007.17 The NYU Report
contends that the FBI name check delays may violate U.S. law18 and
international law19 because the process profiles "immigrants perceived to be
Muslim, Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian on the basis of their name,
race, religion, ethnicity, or national origin."20 The NYU Report also claims
that the delays violate binding U.S. obligations to non-citizens under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)21 and the

Requirements to Field Leadership 2 (Feb. 4, 2008), http://www.greencard
lawyers.com/news/2008/AdjustmentApplications%20.pdf (stating that if "the FBI name
check request has been pending for more than 180 days, the adjudicator shall approve the
application and proceed with the card issuance").
14. See generally Recent Mandamus Litigation, supra note 12 (displaying an
expansive database list of old and new cases across the United States involving FBI name
check delays that relied exclusively on domestic statutes for relief).
15. See CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS & GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW,
AMERICANS ON HOLD: PROFILING, CITIZENSHIP, AND THE "WAR ON TERROR" 4 (2006),
http://www.chrgj.org/docs/AOH/AmericansonHoldReport.pdf [hereinafter NYU REPORT]
(finding "[d]elays in the citizenship process implicate discrimination on grounds that are
prohibited under international law" because "[u]nder international law, policies that impose a
disproportionate burden on particular groups (either purposely or in effect) must be justified
in order not to constitute prohibited discrimination").
16. See id. at 2 (basing the report on research conducted by New York University
(NYU) School of Law’s Center for Human Rights and Global Justice (CHRGJ), the
International Human Rights Clinic, and the Immigrant Rights Clinic, in close collaboration
with the Council of People’s Organization (COPO) in Brooklyn, New York).
17. See id. (analyzing the FBI name check delays and their impact on Muslim, Arab,
Middle Eastern, and South Asian descent).
18. See id. at 25 ("[C]itizenship delays may violate U.S. law, including, for example,
section 555(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act.").
19. See id. at 31 ("The importance of the right to be infringed by disproportionate
name checks, combined with the lack of effectiveness and other detrimental consequences,
render such a disproportionate burden unjustified and illegal under international law.").
20. Id. at 2.
21. Int’l Covenant on Civil & Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976) (adopted by the United States Sept. 8, 1992) [hereinafter ICCPR], available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm (last visited May 13, 2010) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD).22
This Note seeks to contribute to the discussion on this topic by
evaluating the NYU Report’s conclusions.23 Contrary to the NYU Report,
analysis of the United States’ international and domestic legal obligations
produces the following conclusion: delays caused by the FBI name check
procedures do not place the United States in violation of its obligations.24
This analysis reveals a fatal flaw in the NYU Report’s methodology, which
stems from a failure to consider all the applicable reservations,
understandings, and declarations (RUDs).25 These RUDs reveal a different
landscape of legal obligation than the abstract assessment that lies at the
foundation of the NYU Report.26 To support this conclusion, this Note
analyzes the relevant ICCPR and CERD treaty provisions in light of the
applicable RUDs and the political context in which the United States
undertook each obligation.27

22. Int’l Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A.
Res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966)
(entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) (adopted by the United States Oct. 21, 1994) [hereinafter
CERD], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm (on file with the
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice); see also NYU REPORT,
supra note 15, at 25–26 (discussing the "[c]itizenship delays for the profiled group also
implicate a number of international human rights protections guaranteed to non-citizens,"
including the ICCPR and the CERD).
23. See NYU REPORT, supra note 15, at 37–39 (concluding that the name check
procedure invites discrimination that is illegal under international law. It also recommends
ways the United States can "live up to its international human rights obligations and its
democratic ideals and end discrimination and undue delays in the naturalization process").
24. See infra Part I (explaining that the FBI name check procedures do not violate
international laws); see also infra Part VI (discussing the FBI name check procedures and
the United States’ domestic obligation).
25. See infra Part I (highlighting the fact that the NYU Report does not mention the
United States’ reservations, declarations, or understandings to the ICCPR or the CERD in
reaching its conclusion on the United States’ treaty violations).
26. Compare NYU REPORT, supra note 15, at 25–30 (arguing that the United States’
actions violate international law while failing to mention the United States’ reservations,
declarations, or understandings), with infra Part I (explaining that the United States’ use of
RUDs is a compromising mechanism enabling ratification of HRTs while keeping intact the
domestic rights structure under the U.S. Constitution and discussing why the United States’
RUDs to HRTs would not place the FBI name check delays in direct violation of
international obligations).
27. 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. RUDs to ICCPR]; 140 CONG.
REC. S7634-02 (daily ed. June 24, 1994) [hereinafter U.S. RUDs to CERD], available at
http://www1.umn.edu /humanrts/usdocs/racialres.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
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This Note is divided into seven parts. Part I begins by detailing the
limitations of the United States’ obligations under international human
rights law. Part II establishes the United States’ ICCPR nondiscrimination
obligations. This is accomplished by scrutinizing the confusing textual
provisions of the treaty, delineating the scope of the United States’ RUDs,
and expounding on the conflicts between the United States and the Human
Rights Committee (HRC), which serves as the enforcement body of the
treaty. Part III analyzes the enforcement mechanisms and the remedies
available under the ICCPR. It further explains how the United States’
obligations under the ICCPR, circumscribed by the applicable RUDs,
hinder enforcement and redress for injured parties. Part IV establishes the
United States’ CERD nondiscrimination obligations. It also deciphers a
complex citizenship exception unveiled by the interplay of the textual
provisions, and describes the competing interpretations by the United States
and the CERD Committee, which serves as the enforcement body of the
treaty. Part V explores why the United States’ reservations under the
CERD likewise prevent relief for persons alleging impermissible
discrimination. Part VI discusses the limited reach of the ICCPR and the
non-existent application of the CERD in domestic courts. It focuses on the
federal courts’ deference to the non-self-execution declarations and to the
plenary power doctrine on immigration. Finally, this Note concludes by
exploring the future implications of the delays caused by the FBI name
check process.
I. The Limits of the United States’ Obligations Under International Human
Rights Law
Since World War II, the United States has played a commanding role
in transforming human rights treaties (HRTs) from mere rhetoric into
binding international law.28 Historically, treaty drafters frequently utilized
the U.S. Constitution’s Bill of Rights as a model for constructing many of
the HRTs currently in use.29 To date, the United States remains committed

28. See Michelle Friedman, The Uneasy U.S. Relationship with Human Rights
Treaties: The Constitutional Treaty System and Nonself-Executing Declarations, 17 FLA. J.
INT’L L. 187, 189 (2005) (discussing the historical backdrop of the United States’ role in
bringing these treaties to fruition).
29. See John Quigley, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
the Supremacy Clause, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1287, 1308–09 (1993) (noting examples of other
treaties such as the Torture Convention and the Race Convention).
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to advancing HRTs to an extent.30 The restrictions placed on the United
States’ support and obligations stem from a fundamental clash between the
U.S. constitutional system and the expansive rights articulated within most
HRTs to gain broader adherence by the international community.31 To
resolve the inconsistencies between the United States and HRTs regarding
the structure, scope, and substance of rights, RUDs became a requirement
in all HRTs ratified by the United States since the 1970s.32
Over the years, many within the international community have
condemned the United States’ consistent use of RUDs.33 Critics cite the
United States’ perceived double standard of supporting HRTs but
conditioning its support through the use of RUDs.34 Despite the opposition,
the United States’ use of RUDs remains a common feature of its accession
to international legal obligations since the inception of the republic more
than two hundred years ago.35 Moving into the post-9/11 landscape, RUDs
may have gained even more importance in the United States with the
growing concerns over terrorism and national security. Indeed, RUDs
preserve the U.S. constitutional structure, which provides the President with
the flexibility to make swift decisions in times of war and national
emergency without interference by international organizations.36
30. See id. ("It thus seems anomalous [after the United States had such influence on
the process] that once these rights are affirmed in a solemn document like the Covenant, the
United States should seek to protect itself.").
31. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 400 (2000) (analyzing this clash in greater
detail).
32. See id. at 400–01 ("The RUDs address each of the challenges outlined above.");
see also David N. Cinotti, The New Isolationism: Non-Self-Execution Declarations and
Treaties as the Supreme Law of the Land, 91 GEO. L.J. 1277, 1278 (2003) (highlighting the
U.S. Senate’s consistent pattern of attaching RUDs to "every major human rights treaty to
which it has given its advice and consent since World War II").
33. See Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights
Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 347, 351–53 (2000) (explaining the double standard approach by
the United States and the negative reaction by other countries).
34. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law and the United States
Double Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 2d 365, 366 (1998) (noting that "the United States does not
embrace the international human rights standard that it urges on others"); see also Roth,
supra note 33, at 352 (highlighting the double standard approach).
35. See Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Approval of Treaties by the U.S. Senate, 19
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 89, 91, 97 (1996) (noting that over the last two hundred
years, the United States has entered into more than 12,000 bilateral and multilateral
agreements and ratified approximately fifteen percent with the inclusion of RUDs).
36. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, The Unexceptional U.S. Human Rights RUDs, 3 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 311, 313 (2005) ("[T]he United States made clear its understanding that certain
provisions that it did consent to . . . were no more stringent than analogous rules under the
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II. U.S. Nondiscrimination Obligations Under the ICCPR

Several years after the United States ratified the ICCPR with the
inclusion of RUDs,37 the HRC sought to limit the reach of RUDs submitted
by state parties regarding nondiscrimination treaty provisions.38 But the
HRC’s aim at compliance has proven challenging for two reasons: the
flexible design of the ICCPR provisions, and the RUDs submitted by state
parties.39 These challenges have led to a modern day tug-of-war between
the HRC and the state parties as to the precise nature of these
nondiscrimination obligations.40
Scholars often rely on a blend of ICCPR provisions and HRC
recommendations when analyzing the United States’ ICCPR obligations.41
U.S. Constitution."); Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 400–01 (stating that many
treaties pose problems to the U.S. constitutional system, specifically in terms of substance,
scope, and structure, and that RUDs alleviate these domestic concerns and allow the U.S. to
ratify these treaties).
37. See ICCPR, supra note 21, at 1 (ratifying the ICCPR on Mar. 23, 1976).
38. See Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24(52), U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (1994), reproduced in Senate Report, 34 I.L.M. 839, 840–41
(1995) [hereinafter HRC General Comment 24(52)], available at http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/gencomm/hrcom24.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice). The HRC General Comment states:
As of 1 November 1994, 46 of the 127 States parties to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights had, between them, entered 150
reservations of varying significance to their acceptance of the obligations of the
Covenant. Some of these reservations exclude the duty to provide and guarantee
particular rights in the Covenant. Others are couched in more general terms,
often directed to ensuring the continued paramountcy of certain domestic legal
provisions. Still others are directed at the competence of the Committee. The
number of reservations, their content and their scope may undermine the
effective implementation of the Covenant and tend to weaken respect for the
obligations of States parties.
Id.
39. See Sarah Joseph, A Rights Analysis of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
5 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 57, 91 (1999) (explaining that the uncertainty surrounding the
construction of the ICCPR and state party reservations to the ICCPR created "a clear tension
between the classical view of treaties creating bilateral and multilateral relations between
States, which informs the customary law of reservations, and the modern view that human
rights treaties essentially create bilateral relations between ‘State parties’ and individuals").
40. See id. ("If the customary law reflected in the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion and the
Vienna Convention applies to the ICCPR, incompatible reservations unfortunately render the
ICCPR wholly void in the reserving State.").
41. See NYU REPORT, supra note 15, at 25–31 (relying on a blend of ICCPR
provisions, HRC Recommendations, and CERD provisions to define the nature and the
scope of human rights protections owed to non-citizens by the United States under its treaty
obligations).
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Despite the advancements made by scholars in addressing this issue, a
subtle problem has emerged. The HRC and scholars consistently rely on a
selective mix of ICCPR provisions and on supporting documentation that
largely exclude RUDs to justify their positions.42 This Part adjusts that
selective framework and reestablishes the United States’ ICCPR
nondiscrimination obligations through the explicit text of the ICCPR and
the United States’ RUDs.43 A three-part analysis accomplishes this end by
reviewing the textually confusing articles of the ICCPR, analyzing how the
United States solved this confusion through RUDs, and explaining the
rationale for the United States’ legal use of FBI name check procedures.
A. Textual Confusion
Three ICCPR articles encompass the uneven nondiscrimination
provisions at issue. Those articles are Article 2, Article 4, and Article 26.
Specifically, Article 2 articulates a restrictive provision that state parties
shall ensure the rights of all individuals without making "distinction[s] of
any kind regarding race, colour . . . religion . . . or national origin," among
others.44
42. See id. (relying largely on ICCPR provisions to outline the obligations of the
United States).
43. Despite claims made by the NYU Report, greater attention is needed to address
this complex and unclear issue.
44. See ICCPR, supra note 21, at art. 2, which states:
1. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure
to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.
2. Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each
State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the
present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may be necessary to
give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.
3. Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by
any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and
to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when

456

16 WASH. & LEE J.C.R. SOC. JUST. 447 (2010)

Next, Article 4 permits a state party to derogate from its normal
ICCPR obligations during a time of national emergency.45 But this
derogation is limited. A state party can only take measures that are
consistent with its obligations under international law and measures that do
not involve discrimination based "solely" on the grounds of "race, colour,
sex, language, religion, or social origin."46
Finally, Article 26 states that all persons are "equal before the law" and
entitled to "equal protection of the law" without discrimination.47 Article
26 is qualified by a second phrase that extends additional rights to "all
persons."48 This phrase guarantees "equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour . . . religion . . . [or]
national origin."49
At first glance, these three provisions appear to circumscribe the
boundaries of state party obligations with discrimination. A careful study
of these provisions, however, unmasks significant textual gaps that may
undermine the intended restrictions on these provisions. These textual gaps
granted.
45. See ICCPR, supra note 21, at art. 4, which states:
1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present
Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the present
Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation,
provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground
of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin . . . .
3. Any State Party to the present Covenant availing itself of the right of
derogation shall immediately inform the other States Parties to the present
Covenant, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons by
which it was actuated. A further communication shall be made, through the
same intermediary, on the date on which it terminates such derogation.
46. Id.; Compare ICCPR, supra note 44, at art. 2 (protecting against "discrimination
on any ground" (emphasis added)), with ICCPR, supra note 45, at art. 4 ("[D]iscrimination
solely on the ground." (emphasis added)), and ICCPR, infra note 47, at art. 26 ("[W]ithout
distinction of any kind."), for closer evaluation of this issue.
47. See ICCPR, supra note 21, at art. 26, which states:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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render a state party’s obligations under the ICCPR unclear, which may in
turn translate to a valid justification for the United States’ use of an FBI
name check procedure under the ICCPR.
More specifically, two examples demonstrate the confusion
surrounding this issue and illustrate why the FBI name check procedures
are consistent with ICCPR obligations. First, treaty drafters used the term
"distinction" in Article 2, which they juxtaposed with the term
"discrimination" in Article 4 and in Article 26.50 The subtle variation infers
that a state party can derogate from its obligation under Article 4 and can
utilize a program that does not discriminate based "solely" on "race,
colour . . . religion or social origin."51 Therefore, if all of the Article 4
requirements are satisfied, the United States may be justified in utilizing
FBI name check procedures that have an unfortunate "discriminating"
effect.52
Article 26 provides the second example. The drafters constructed
Article 26 with two key phrases: "equal before the law" and "equal
protection of the law," which are not listed as non-derogation rights in
Article 4.53 In conjunction, the nondiscrimination terms contained within
Article 2 are limited by Article 4,54 but these terms are absent in Article
26.55 This juxtaposition reveals a possible exception for state parties to
adopt differing standards of treatment for non-citizens and citizens. In
context, this implies that the United States can continue performing FBI
name checks without violating its ICCPR treaty obligations.

50. See id. at art. 4 (regarding the comparison of the terms "distinctions" and
"discrimination" within the three ICCPR articles).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Compare ICCPR, supra note 47, at art. 26 ("[R]ace, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."),
with ICCPR supra note 45, at art. 4 ("[R]ace, colour, sex, language, religion or social
origin."), to evaluate the list of terms stated in Article 26 that are not stated as nonderogating rights within Article 4.
54. See ICCPR, supra note 45, at art. 4 (referring to the Article 4 restrictive exception
"solely" during national emergencies).
55. Compare ICCPR, supra note 44, at art. 2 (stating that the state shall protect against
"discrimination of any kind, such as" (emphasis added)), with ICCPR, supra note 47, at art.
26 ("[P]rotection against discrimination based on any ground."), and ICCPR, supra note 45,
at art. 4 (stating that the state can discriminate under certain circumstances so long as it
"does not involve discrimination solely on" certain grounds), to see the Nondiscrimination
terms in play and how they are limited by Article 4, but remain absent from the provisions in
Article 26.
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B. Confusion to Clarity: The United States’ RUDs

The uncertainty produced by internal inconsistencies in the text of the
ICCPR was not lost on the Senate. In 1992, the Senate addressed the
textual confusion when it considered whether to give advice and consent for
the ratification of the ICCPR.56 In fulfilling its advice function, the Senate
included several RUDs.57 The Senate also included an explanation of how
the ICCPR provisions correspond with U.S. law.58 The Senate explained
that Article 2, Article 4, and Article 26 "do not precisely comport with
long-standing Supreme Court doctrine in the equal protection field."59
Accordingly, the Senate emphasized that U.S. law permits discrimination
between "citizens and non-citizens and between different categories of noncitizens, especially in the context of the immigration laws."60
Citing to a formal HRC interpretation, the Senate reiterated its belief
that the ICCPR’s inherent flexibility may permit the adoption of different
procedures based on nationality and other justifications.61
This
interpretation stated that "identical treatment in every instance" is not
mandated by the ICCPR.62 The Senate reinforced that if the distinctions
made under U.S. law are reasonable, objective, and related to a purpose
under the ICCPR, they would not violate the United States’ treaty
obligations.63 Thus, "distinctions," as defined under Article 2 and Article
26, are "permitted" when they are at a minimum "rationally related to a
56. See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. REP. NO. 102-23, at 22 (1992), reprinted in
31 I.L.M. 645, 654–55 (1992) ("The very broad anti-discrimination provisions contained in
the above articles [2, 4, and 26] do not precisely comport with longstanding Supreme Court
doctrine in the equal protection field.").
57. U.S. RUDs to ICCPR, supra note 27, at 1 ("[T]he Senate’s advise and consent to
the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . . . subject to the
following Reservations, Understandings, Declarations and Proviso.").
58. See id. (noting several exceptions and clarifications, including for example, "[t]hat
because U.S. law generally applies to an offender the penalty in force at the time the offence
was committed, the United States does not adhere to the third clause of paragraph 1 of
Article 15").
59. S. REP. NO. 102-103, supra note 56, at 22.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. See id. (citing to the HRC’s General Comment).
62. Id. ("In its General Comment on Nondiscrimination, for example, the Committee
noted that the enjoyment of rights and freedoms on an equal footing does not mean identical
treatment in every instance.").
63. See id. (recommending a specific interpretation of the United States’ treaty
obligations).
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legitimate governmental objective."64 In addition, under Article 4, the
Senate reasoned that discrimination based "solely" on the factors articulated
within this article will not "bar distinctions" that render disproportionate
effects on people of a certain status.65 Finally, the Senate emphasized that
the United States’ ICCPR obligations are defined by RUDs submitted at
ratification and the explanations of how those RUDs comport with U.S.
law.66
C. Rhetoric Revolt: HRC Conflictions to State Party RUDs
Two years later, the HRC responded with General Comment 24(52) to
limit the reach of the RUDs submitted by the United States and forty-six
other countries.67 The HRC’s efforts, however, had the opposite effect.
Rather than tempering the reach of the United States’ RUDs, General
Comment 24(52) gave the United States an opportunity to respond, clarify,
and discuss the limitations of its perceived obligations.68 Through three key
misstatements within General Comment 24(52), this section explains the
United States’ plausible justification for continuing the FBI name check
procedure without violating the ICCPR.
The first issue with General Comment 24(52) involves the HRC’s
claim to legally binding authority over state parties regarding the
interpretation of treaty reservations.69 The HRC explained that when a state
64. Id.
65. See id. ("The United States further understands the prohibition in paragraph 1 of
Article 4 upon discrimination, in time of public emergency, based ‘solely’ on the status of
race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin not to bar distinctions that may have a
disproportionate effect upon persons of a particular status.").
66. See id. ("In a few instances, however, it is necessary to subject U.S. ratification to
reservations, understandings or declarations in order to ensure that the United States can
fulfill its obligations under the Covenant in a manner consistent with the United States
Constitution.").
67. See HRC General Comment 24(52), supra note 38, 34 I.L.M. at 844 (discussing
the 150 reservations of varying significance submitted by state parties upon ratification of
the ICCPR).
68. See Observations by the United States on General Comment 24, 3 INT’L HUM. RTS.
REP. 265, 269 (1996) [hereinafter U.S. Response] (discussing five specific concerns of the
United States regarding General Comment 24(52)). See generally Observations by the
United Kingdom on General Comment 24, 3 INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 261, 261–69 (1996);
Observations by France on General Comment 24 on Reservations to the ICCPR, 4 INT’L
HUM. RTS. REP. 6, 6–8 (1997); United Nations Int’l Law Comm’n U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/52/10 (1997).
69. See HRC General Comment 24(52), supra note 38, 34 I.L.M., at 844 (stating that a
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party submits a reservation that stands against the interpretation of the
HRC, this reservation will be considered "contrary to" the object and
purpose of the ICCPR.70 The United States noted that this "surprising
assertion" infers that the HRC has the ability to render legally binding
interpretations over state parties.71 This presents a fundamental problem
because the ICCPR does not extend this power to the HRC.72 As the United
States explained, ICCPR drafters "could have given the Committee this role
but deliberately chose not to do so."73 The United States therefore does not
recognize the HRC as a binding legal authority to judge the validity of its
RUDs to the ICCPR.74
Instead, the United States reaffirmed its adherence to the principles of
customary international law reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, which is widely held as the primary standard on treaty
interpretation.75 The HRC disagreed with this reasoning and explained that
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties was "inadequate" and
"inappropriate" to address unique problems associated with the ICCPR.76
reservation to an obligation under the ICCPR does not affect a state’s duty to comply with its
substantive obligations under the treaty).
70. Id.
71. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 266 (noting that it would be a departure from
the ICCPR’s scheme for the HRC to have the authority to bind states to its interpretations of
the treaty).
72. See ICCPR, supra note 21 (lacking any provisions within the fifty-three articles of
the ICCPR that give the HRC this authority); see also U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 266
(stressing that the HRC does not have binding legal authority); see also Joseph, supra note
39 (explaining that "HRC findings are not legally binding, unlike those of international
judicial bodies like the International Court of Justice or the European Court of Human
Rights").
73. U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 267 (emphasis added).
74. See id. at 269 (rejecting the proposition that the HRC can sever reservations it
deems invalid by stating that the United States’ reservations are integral to its consent to be
bound by the ICCPR).
75. See id. at 266 (noting that the Vienna Convention has established rules of treaty
interpretation that the Committee seems to reject); see generally Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf.
76. See HRC General Comment 24(52), supra note 38, 34 I.L.M. at 845 (discussing
the HRC’s reasons for not relying on the Vienna Convention). The HRC stated:
The Committee believes that its provisions on the role of State objections in
relation to reservations are inappropriate to address the problem of reservations
to human rights treaties. Such treaties, and the Covenant specifically, are not a
web of inter-State exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern the
endowment of individuals with rights. The principle of inter-State reciprocity
has no place, save perhaps in the limited context of reservations to declarations
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In addition, the HRC reiterated that it would now be regarded as the
supreme authority on interpreting whether a state party’s RUDs are
"compatible with the object and purpose" of the ICCPR.77 Although the
HRC may have good reason for claiming this role, its reasoning conflicts
with the ICCPR’s overall scheme, and therefore violates international law.78
Moreover, the HRC realistically has only persuasive power and lacks the
authority to dictate to sovereign states the methodology for treaty
interpretation, particularly when that methodology is inconsistent with the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.79
A second issue involves the role of international peremptory norms80
in ICCPR reservations.81 The HRC maintains that when a reservation
conflicts with established international peremptory norms, the reservation
automatically will be regarded as incompatible with the object and purpose
of the ICCPR.82 The United States does not question this assertion.83
Rather, the United States questions whether a state party has the
freedom to exclude "one means of enforcement of particular norms by
reserving against inclusion of those norms in its Covenant
obligations."84 This issue remains unclear within international law.85
on the Committee’s competence under article 41. And because the operation of
the classic rules on reservations is so inadequate for the Covenant, States have
often not seen any legal interest in or need to object to reservations.
Id.
77. Id.
78. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 266 (discussing the role of the HRC in
interpreting reservations and treaty terms).
79. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 266 (noting the HRC’s lack of authority to
render binding interpretations and reinforcing that the HRC appears to reject the rules of
treaty interpretation in the Vienna Convention).
80. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 702 cmt. n (1987) (defining international peremptory norms, often termed "jus cogens"
[which translates in English to "compelling law"] as baseline fundamental principles of
international law recognized by the international community, which cannot be derogated
from). These universal norms include: genocide, slavery, and murder as a state policy. See
id. §§ 702(a)–(c).
81. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 268 (highlighting the peremptory norms
relevant to the object and purpose of the treaty).
82. See HRC General Comment 24(52), supra note 38, 34 I.L.M. at 842 (stating that
the reservations that offend peremptory norms are not compatible with the Covenant).
83. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 267 ("It is clear that a State cannot exempt
itself from a peremptory norm of international law by making a reservation to the
Covenant.").
84. Id.
85. Id. ("It is not at all clear that a State cannot choose to exclude one means of
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Accordingly, the United States maintains that the HRC does not have the
ability under international law to render binding judgments within this
context.86 Until this area of international law is developed, the United
States believes that it remains consistent with its ICCPR obligations
when it reserves against the inclusion of specific norms.87
Additionally, the United States criticized the HRC’s narrow per se
approach that invalidated all reservations conflicting with international
peremptory norms or the object and purpose of the ICCPR.88 The HRC
does not have the power to make these assertions in this context either.89
Instead, customary international law provides the appropriate test.90
This test regarding the object and purpose analysis on non-derogated
rights in treaty reservations requires full consideration of the entire
treaty and the specific rights and provisions at issue on a case-by-case
basis.91 A subtle problem emerges, however, with application to the
ICCPR because the treaty lacks an explicit reference to an accepted
object and purpose test regarding interpretation.92 Therefore, the default
guide in this situation is customary international law, which favors the
United States’ approach.93
A third issue involves a fundamental disagreement between the
HRC and the United States over a precise definition of the object and
purpose of the ICCPR.94 The HRC narrowly interprets the ICCPR’s
enforcement of particular norms by reserving against inclusion of those norms in its
Covenant obligations."); see also Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 307,
355–63 (2006) (discussing the clash in perspectives on this issue between the Special
Rapporteur for the International Law Commission and the HRC).
86. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 266 (stating that the HRC lacks authority to
render binding judgments and interpretations).
87. See id. at 267 (stating that a liberal view of reservations would secure the widest
possible adherence to the ICCPR, which is the primary object and purpose of the Covenant).
88. See id. at 267 (noting that the HRC’s approach is unsupported by international
law).
89. See id. at 266 (reinforcing that the HRC lacks the binding legal authority to decide
this issue).
90. See id. at 267 (arguing that the HRC’s per se approach is contrary to international
law).
91. See id. (recognizing that an analysis of non-derogable rights requires consideration
of the specific treaty, right, and reservation at issue).
92. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 31, at 434 ("Unlike other human rights
treaties, including one of the optional protocols to the ICCPR (which the United States has
not ratified), the ICCPR contains no clause excluding reservations and no reference to the
object and purpose test.").
93. Id.
94. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 267 (comparing the different definitions
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object and purpose as a "legally binding standard for human rights"
when any type of reservation to a critical provision of the treaty
undermines its object and purpose.95 The United States adheres to a
broader understanding.96 It construes the ICCPR’s object and purpose to
"protect human rights," as defined by the understanding that immediate
and universal implementation of all provisions is not required.97 To this
end, the United States believes that the object and purpose of the ICCPR
are focused on gaining wide adherence by the international community
to a basic standard of civil and political rights.98
In sum, analysis of these three issues explains why the HRC has
limited power to interpret the scope of the United States’ RUDs. These
limitations are relevant because the HRC would lack the ability to
compel the United States to change its policy regarding the FBI name
check procedure unless this policy stood in contrast to the overall object
and purpose of the treaty or to international peremptory norms.
III. ICCPR International Enforcement Mechanisms and Remedies
This Part explores the clash between the United States and the
HRC, which is the enforcement body of the ICCPR.99 This Part also
of the object and purpose of the Covenant).
95. See HRC General Comment 24(52), supra note 38, 34 I.L.M. at 842 (stating
that the underpinning behind the Covenant is to create human rights standards by
defining civil and political rights and making them binding obligations on state parties).
96. See U.S. Response, supra note 68, at 267 (stating that the narrow
interpretation of the Committee is unsupported by international law).
97. See id. (defining the object and purpose of the Covenant to be protection of
human rights, and dismissing the idea that "any reservation to any substantive provision
necessarily contravenes the Covenant’s object and purpose") (emphasis added).
98. See id. ("In fact, a primary object and purpose of the Covenant was to secure
the widest possible adherence, with the clear understanding that a relatively liberal
regime on the permissibility of reservations should therefore be required.").
99. See ICCPR, supra note 21, at art. 28 (establishing the HRC and its
composition). This article states:
1. There shall be established a Human Rights Committee (hereafter referred to
in the present Covenant as the Committee). It shall consist of eighteen members
and shall carry out the functions hereinafter provided. 2. The committee shall be
composed of nationals of the States Parties to the present Covenant who shall be
persons of high moral character and recognized competence in the field of
human rights, consideration being given to the usefulness of the participation of
some persons having legal experience. 3. The members of the Committee shall
be elected and shall serve in their personal capacity.
Id.
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analyzes the fundamental problem with the HRC’s structure, its design,
and its application to the United States’ RUDs. Then, it concludes by
arguing that individuals and state parties have no means of recovery
against the United States for FBI name check delays.
Article 40 is the primary line of ICCPR enforcement for a state
party.100 This article requires a state party to submit periodic reports
documenting its progress with implementing the ICCPR.101 The HRC
responds to state periodic reports with its own report documenting a
state party’s progress.102 Normally, a back-and-forth constructive
dialogue forms, which usually results in greater adherence to the
ICCPR.103 This is not always the case. If a state party refuses to
change a conflicting policy, the HRC lacks any legal or physical
ability to force compliance.104 This leaves the HRC with limited
recourse.105 As one scholar correctly noted, "[B]ad publicity is the
only sanction for a State that blatantly ignores the [HRC’s]
findings."106
If the HRC demanded that the United States change its FBI name
check policy, the United States could simply reject this suggestion
without any real consequences. The United States would likely take
this precise course of action because it has worked successfully in
other contexts.107
100. See id. at art. 40 (requiring state parties to submit reports on the measures that they
have adopted to comply with the ICCPR for review and response by the HRC).
101. Id. at art. 40(1).
102. Id. at art. 40(4).
103. See Joseph, supra note 39, at 65–66 (reinforcing that the fundamental purpose
behind this dialogue is to improve the adherence by all state parties).
104. See Ineke Boerefijn, Towards a Strong System of Supervision: The Human Rights
Committee’s Role in Reforming the Reports Procedure Under Article 40 of the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 766, 772 (1995) (noting that the aim is to form a
"constructive dialogue" between the state parties and the HRC).
105. See Joseph, supra note 39, at 66 (stating that the "HRC findings are not legally
binding, unlike those of international judicial bodies like the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) or the European Court of Human Rights"); see also U.S. Response, supra note 68, at
266 (reinforcing the HRC’s lack of binding authority).
106. See id. (stating that some state parties will outright reject recommendations by the
HRC and refuse to adhere due to soft international law enforcement policies).
107. See U.S. STATE DEP’T, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO SELECTED
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (2007), http://www.state.gov/docu
ments/organization/100845.pdf (highlighting the issue of extraterritorial application of the
ICCPR and the United States’ firm disagreement with the HRC and no further consequence
for this disagreement). The United States specifically stated at the outset of this response
that it takes "this opportunity to reaffirm its long-standing position that the Covenant does
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The second mechanism for ICCPR enforcement against a state
party is Article 41.108 This article permits a state party to file formal
ICCPR complaints against another state party for treaty violations.109
But this article’s application against the United States proves
unrealistic for two reasons: a state party would not jeopardize its
relationship with the United States over an internal U.S. immigration
policy and Article 41 has never been used by a state party.110
A third state party enforcement mechanism is the First Optional
Protocol.111 It provides individuals with redress against a state party.112
For this protocol to work, the state party in question must ratify this
protocol.113 The United States has not ratified it; so this option is
useless. Thus, all three redress options prove ineffective.
IV. U.S. Nondiscrimination Obligations Under the CERD
Two years after ratifying the ICCPR,114 the United States ratified
another multilateral treaty, the CERD, to reinforce its commitment to
nondiscrimination.115 The United States included numerous RUDs to
not apply extraterritorially." Id. at 1 (emphasis added). Additionally, the United States
maintains that it "respectfully disagrees with the view of the Committee that the Covenant
applies extraterritorially." Id. As noted from this long-standing position of the United
States, it has suffered no repercussions in relation to its disagreement with the HRC. Id.
108. ICCPR, supra note 21, at art. 41.
109. Id.
110. See Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and the International Protection of
Religious Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 33, 92
(2002) (explaining that although the optional inter-state procedure in Article 41 falls within
the Human Rights Committee’s area of operation it has never been used).
111. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16
Dec. 1966, U.N.T.S., vol. 999, p. 171, art. 1 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976) [hereinafter
ICCPR Optional Protocol], available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3
bf0.html (last visited Feb. 5 2010) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
112. See id. ("A State Party . . . recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive
and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be
victims of a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant.").
113. See id. at art. 9(2) (stating that the Protocol will enter into force three months after
ratification).
114. See ICCPR, supra note 21 (noting that the United States adopted the ICCPR in
1992).
115. See CERD, supra note 22, preamble (outlining the goal of eliminating all forms of
racial discrimination).
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most CERD provisions.116
The international community reacted
skeptically to this and questioned the United States’ commitment to
nondiscrimination.117 The thrust behind this skepticism stemmed from
the blurring effect RUDs had on defining the United States’ CERD
obligations.118 Therefore, in application to the FBI name check policy,
uncertainty remains regarding whether some legal distinctions under this
policy qualify as illegal discrimination under the CERD.119 The NYU
Report focused on this exact point.120 It argued that the United States
violated the CERD through FBI name check delays that target noncitizens within the Muslim, Arab, Middle Eastern, and South Asian
communities.121 The United States addressed similar concerns in its
annual report to the CERD Committee, but declined to state that
government actions were in violation of the treaty.122 Instead, it
116. U.S. RUDs to CERD, supra note 27 (referencing the formal document listing the
RUDs submitted by the United States upon ratification of the CERD).
117. International scholars take issue with the United States’ ratification of the CERD
with the accompaniment of the non-self-executing doctrine. See, e.g., Gay J. McDougall,
Toward a Meaningful International Regime: The Domestic Relevance of International
Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 40 HOW. L.J. 571, 588 (1997)
(noting that the United States’ ratification of the CERD with non-self-executing provisions
"further exposes the U.S. to justifiable claims of hypocrisy at the international level"); see
also Nkechi Taifa, Codification or Castration? The Applicability of the International
Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Racial Discrimination to the U.S. Criminal Justice
System, 40 HOW. L.J. 641, 650 (1997) (stressing that it is "politically expedient for the
United States to ratify" HRT’s with RUDs in the event that this "practice not only restricts
these treaties’ impact in the United States, but nullifies their effect. This self-serving policy
has continued through the Carter, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations").
118. See Taifa, supra note 117, at 651 (reasoning that this may be due to the United
States attaching certain RUDs "to all human rights treaties ratified by the U.S.,
including . . . provisions which might be in conflict with the U.S. Constitution").
119. See NYU REPORT, supra note 15, at 25 (referring to the deliberate distinction
between citizens and non-citizens because less protection is provided for those discriminated
against based on their non-citizen status).
120. Id.
121. See id. (stating that "[c]itizenship delays for the profiled group also implicate a
number of international human rights protections guaranteed to non-citizens," and further
explaining that the United States is "obligated to ensure Nondiscrimination in access to
citizenship"). The NYU Report consistently relies on the CERD Committee’s general
recommendations throughout its discussion to argue for clear U.S. obligations under this
context. Id.
122. See Periodic Report of the United States of America to the U.N. Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination Concerning the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, paras. 53–54, delivered to the U.N.
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Apr. 2007) [hereinafter CERD
Periodic Report], available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/cerd_report/83404.htm ("Thus,
despite significant progress, numerous challenges still exist, and the United States
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acknowledged the "on-going challenges" that still exist in this area and
explained that government institutions charged with eliminating
discrimination are making "significant progress" despite considerable
work that remains in fixing this difficult issue.123
Building upon the preceding discussion, this Part focuses on the
difference between distinctions and discrimination under the United
States’ CERD obligations relating to FBI name check delays. This Part
also unmasks a citizenship exception found within Article 1, Article 2,
and Article 5. The analysis then explores the CERD Committee’s
reaction and the United States’ response. Finally, this Part applies this
framework to the FBI name check delay issue.
A. Unmasking the Citizenship Exception
The analysis in this section considers the inherent problems with
the CERD’s expansive definition of "racial discrimination."124 It is
possible that the original CERD drafters never considered that Article 1
might be used to provide state parties with a citizenship exception.125
For example, the initial Third Committee of CERD drafters structured
Article 1(2) as a broad exception to the CERD, which allows a state
party
to
make
"distinctions,
exclusions,
restrictions
or
preferences . . . between citizens and non-citizens." 126 Accordingly, the
United States could use this language to make three legal distinctions
that do not rise to the level of discrimination.

recognizes that a great deal of work remains to be done.").
123. See id. at para. 53 (drawing out why these challenges exist within the United
States).
124. See Patrick Thornberry, Confronting Racial Discrimination: A CERD
Perspective, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 239, 254 (2005) (explaining that because an exact
definition was not incorporated under Article 1, the Convention has, in turn, left the CERD
Committee with an opening to "their interpretation [of] developments in the human rights
cannon").
125. See id. at 251 ("The ground of ‘national origin’ generated considerable discussion
in the drafting of the Convention, but has not unduly troubled the Committee in practice.").
126. See WARWICK MCKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 156–157 (Oxford: Clarendon Press (1983)) (referencing that the Third Committee set
forth this provision to "make clear" that discrimination based on alien status would not be
prohibited nor condemned) (citing UN docs. A/C3/L 1238; A/6181, particularly ¶¶ 30–37;
E/CN.4/Sub.2/335 ¶¶ 38–39).
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Alienage is one way the United States could distinguish
individuals. The term "alienage" remains absent from Article 1,127 and
therefore operates outside the discrimination definition stated in the
The CERD Committee would object to this narrow
CERD.128
interpretation; instead, it would construe Article 1 to include alienage.
Under this interpretation, the CERD Committee would then claim that
the FBI name check policy amounts to discrimination and violates the
CERD. The CERD Committee may have a valid argument under this
logic. But it lacks the ability to hold the United States accountable
through law or through physical force.
Article 1(3) provides a second way the United States could
distinguish individuals.129 The United States could utilize the national
security exception or the alternative grounds exception to justify its
actions.130 Specifically, Article 1(3) states that "[n]othing in this
Convention may be interpreted as affecting in any way the legal
provisions of State Parties concerning nationality, citizenship, or
naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate against
any particular nationality."131 This implies that discrimination is
prohibited against "any particular nationality."132 Yet, this rhetoric
remains silent on alternative grounds for discrimination, and Article 1(3)
omits the term "nationality" in its definition.133 The United States thus
has a strong argument for distinguishing individuals based on other
grounds, such as national security, while complying with its CERD
obligations.
127. See CERD, supra note 22, at art. 1(3) ("Nothing in this Convention may be
interpreted as affecting in any way the legal provisions of States Parties concerning
nationality, citizenship or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate
against any particular nationality.").
128. See Theodor Meron, The Meaning and Reach of the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 283, 311–12
(explaining the exception based on citizenship according to Article 1); see also MCKEAN,
supra note 126, at 157–58 ("The exception of aliens qua aliens from the enjoyment on an
equal footing of human rights and fundamental freedoms protected by the Convention is a
clear restriction on the universality of the principle of equality.").
129. See CERD, supra note 22, at art. 1 (referring to nationality and naturalization as
distinguishing characteristics).
130. See NYU REPORT, supra note 15, at 12–13 (explaining that the justification of
"national security" is commonly cited through jurisprudence on this issue in federal district
and appellate courts throughout the thirteen circuits by the USCIS and the FBI).
131. CERD, supra note 22, at art. 1(3).
132. Id.
133. Id.
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A third way the United States could distinguish individuals is by
limiting its CERD obligations to citizens only.134 This is possible
through a combination of Article 2, Article 5, and Article 1.135 At the
outset of this analysis, focus must be directed to the placement and to
the implication of the term "everyone" in Article 5.136 The syntax
structure of Article 5 comports with Article 2 and with the overall
This suggests that the Article 5
consistency of the CERD.137
introductory statement concerning the elimination of discrimination "in
all its forms" folds back into a dialogue with Article 1(2), its definitions,
and its subsequent paragraphs—namely, the citizen and non-citizen
distinction.138 As such, this analysis reveals the possibility that the
United States could legally distinguish non-citizens by limiting its
obligations under the CERD to only citizens.139
In sum, Article 1 does not protect non-citizens from distinctions
made within the United States’ FBI name check policy. Article 1
instead provides three ways the United States could make legal
distinctions without violating the CERD. Although there is a possibility
that treaty drafters overlooked the citizenship exception, this remains
unlikely because no state party would relinquish its sovereign power
over internal citizenship policies to the governing committee of a
multilateral international treaty organization.140

134. See Meron, supra note 128, at 312–13 (noting the scope and the complications
added by Article 5); see also Karl Josef Partsch, Elimination of Racial Discrimination in the
Enjoyment of Civil and Political Rights, 14 TEX. INT’L L.J. 191, 197–98 (highlighting the
necessity of interpretation of Article 5, Article 2, and Article 1 together with the CERD).
135. See generally CERD, supra note 22, at arts. 1, 2, 5.
136. CERD, supra note 22, at art. 5.
137. See Meron, supra note 128, at 312 ("Arguably, then, despite the broad language of
Article 5, state parties may limit their obligations under Article 5 to citizens if this limitation
is not a pretext for racial discrimination.").
138. See Partsch, supra note 134, at 197–98 (discussing the interpretation of the Article
5 phrase "in all its forms").
139. See Meron, supra note 128, at 312 (confirming that a state party to the CERD
could validly make distinctions based solely on citizenship under Article 5). This option
assumes that the United States’ aim was not racially motivated and is justified by an
alternative explanation. Id. Additionally, it is important to note that the CERD has a very
liberal scope on the permissibility of citizenship restrictions. Id.
140. See MCKEAN, supra note 126, at 158 (stating that, regarding alien exclusion under
the CERD, a "clear restriction on the universality of the principles of equality [of
aliens] . . . is made inevitable by the existence of the principle of sovereign states").
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1. CERD Committee Response

In response to the broad structure of the CERD, most state parties
included RUDs that limited their treaty obligations. This frustrated the
CERD Committee. In 1996, the CERD Committee responded by issuing
General Recommendation Fourteen to curb the increased use of RUDs
by state parties.141 General Recommendation Fourteen advanced a new
test for deciding when state parties’ "distinctions" violate the CERD.142
The test analyzed whether a state party’s actions had an "unjustifiable
disparate impact" on a particular group as defined by "colour, descent,
or national or ethnic origin."143
In 1997, the CERD Committee went a step further to regulate
RUDs. This time it enacted General Recommendation Thirty144 with
two goals: tempering state parties’ RUDs and regulating state parties’
naturalization processes.145 The recommendation also defined the
parameters between distinctions based on citizenship and distinctions
based on discrimination. The CERD Committee explained that these
parameters would focus on actions that are "not applied pursuant to a
legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this
aim."146 The new standard became the lens through which the CERD
Committee would view and interpret state party obligations, regardless
of existing RUDs.147

141. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, General Recommendation
14: Definition of Discrimination, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/48/18 (1993), [hereinafter General
Recommendation XIV], available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/84ab9690ccd8
1fc7c12563ed0046fae3 (stating that the aim is to further define what constitutes a distinction
versus discrimination by drawing "attention of States parties to certain features of the
definition of racial discrimination in Article 1, paragraph 1") (on file with the Washington
and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, General Recommendation No.
30: Discrimination Against Non Citizens, preamble (Jan. 10, 2004) [hereinafter General
Recommendation XXX] available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/ doc.nsf/0/e3980a673769e229
c1256f8d0057cd3d?Opendocument (addressing discrimination against non-citizens) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
145. See id. (reaffirming and recommending analysis under Article 5 concerning the
application of discrimination to non-citizens).
146. Id. para. 4 (emphasis added).
147. See id. (defining discrimination against non-citizens).
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2. U.S. RUDs, Periodic Reports, and the Clarifications
Despite the CERD Committee’s new "unjustifiable disparate
impact" standard, the United States qualified its acceptance with a
modified legal framework.148 The United States explained that an
"unjustifiable disparate impact" would occur only when a race-neutral
practice demonstrated "statistically significant racial disparities and are
unnecessary, i.e. unjustifiable."149 In addition, the United States
included an equal protection prong, which increased the standard for
proving this impact, and further insulated the United States from
liability.150
With the United States’ modified framework in place, analysis
shifts to its application for FBI name check delays. The reality of
applying this framework is met with two significant roadblocks: one is
that state parties have not ever used this test; the other is that the
increasing efforts by the USCIS to correct this problem decreased its
impact compared to the overall naturalization numbers.151 Thus, while
citizenship delays are important and are in need of correction, this
situation appears unlikely to reach a level sufficient to trigger an
international treaty violation in which the United States or the CERD
Committee would invoke this test.152
148. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 103d Cong. 19 (1994)
[hereinafter International Convention Hearing] (statement of Conrad K. Harper, Legal
Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State) (reinforcing this premise); see also CERD Periodic Report,
supra note 122, para. 318 ("[I]n seeking to determine whether an action has an effect
contrary to the Convention [the Committee] will look to see whether that action has an
unjustifiable disparate impact." (internal quotations omitted)).
149. See CERD Periodic Report, supra note 122, para. 318 (defining unjustifiable
disparate impact).
150. See General Recommendation XXX, supra note 144 (expounding upon the legal
differences between the United States’ framework and the CERD’s framework under this
context).
151. See CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. OMBUDSMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., ANNUAL REPORT 2007 11–16 (2007), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
CISOMB_Annual_Report_2007.pdf (discussing delays and backlogs in 2007); see also
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. OMBUDSMAN, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL
REPORT 2008, 5–18 (2008), http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOMB_Annual_Report_
2008.pdf (denoting the most recent report on the continuing challenges with this issue).
152. See generally CERD Periodic Report, supra note 122. This 2007 periodic report
to the CERD Committee does not acknowledge or discuss this issue. Instead, the only
inference is the continuous problem that the United States acknowledges with racial tensions
for people of Muslim descent. Id. There is no discussion within the entire document of any
issue regarding the background delays and discrimination. Id. However, the United States
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B. Possible Application of the Citizenship Exception

Taking the analysis a step further, this section explores what could
happen if the FBI name check delays reached a level from which the
CERD Committee found an "unjustifiable disparate impact."153 If this
occurred, the CERD Committee would likely submit a periodic
recommendation report to the United States stressing that the FBI name
check delays violated the CERD. The CERD Committee would ask the
United States to correct this problem. The United States would then
have three options: (1) to accept the CERD Committee’s
recommendations; (2) to acknowledge the issue, but take no action to
rectify the problem; or (3) to outright reject the CERD Committee’s
request.
Option one is unviable. The reason stems from the United States’
regard for the CERD Committee as merely "recommendatory in
nature."154 Options two and three, however, remain viable for several
reasons. First, the United States is working to eliminate the citizenship
delays.155 Second, the United States has a Citizenship and Immigration
Services Ombudsman in place to correct troubling citizenship
situations.156 It therefore remains unlikely that the U.S. government
does, in fact, make clear, on its own accord, that there still exists wide-spread discrimination
in the wake of 9/11 against people of Muslim, Arab, Middle Eastern and South Asian
descent. Id. The United States notes that they are committed to solving this issue, but there
is never any discussion of FBI name check delays, nor any issue of an "unjustifiable
disparate impact." Id.
153. See International Convention Hearing, supra note 147, at 19 (reinforcing this
premise); see also CERD Periodic Report, supra note 122, para. 318 (discussing the
unjustifiable disparate impact standard).
154. See International Convention Hearing, supra note 147, at 15 (pertaining directly
to the discussion of state party RUD’s within General Recommendation 14).
155. See CERD Periodic Report, supra note 122, para. 54 (discussing the need for
continued progress).
156. CIS Ombudsman Website Under the Department of Homeland Security,
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/editorial_0482.shtm (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). Within this
website the Ombudsman states:
The Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (CIS Ombudsman)
provides recommendations for resolving individual and employer problems with
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). As mandated
by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 § 452, CIS Ombudsman is an
independent office that reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Homeland
Security. The CIS Ombudsman:
•
Assists individuals and employers in resolving problems with USCIS;
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would allow recommendations from an international organization to
trump its own efforts.157
In addition, review of this issue and its application to other similar
contexts suggests that there would be minimal consequences if the
United States took no action or rejected the CERD Committee’s
recommendation.158 In the past, the United States disregarded CERD
recommendations and suffered no backlash.159
The plausible
explanation for defiance with no consequences comes from the CERD
Committee’s inability to render binding legal judgments or to force
compliance.160 Accordingly, the CERD Committee’s authority would be
confined to political pressure and persuasive rhetoric.161
V. CERD International Enforcement and Remedies
On the international stage, nearly all of the CERD enforcement
mechanism options prove useless against the United States. The CERD
provides three options for redress covering both state parties and
individuals.162 On a state level, redress is found under Article 11 and

•

Identifies areas in which individuals and employers have problems in
dealing with USCIS; and
•
Proposes changes to mitigate identified problems.
Id. See generally Noël L. Griswold, Forgetting the Melting Pot: An Analysis of the
Department of Homeland Security Takeover of the INS, 39 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 207 (2005)
(exploring and analyzing the newly established Department of Homeland Security).
157. See generally CERD Periodic Report, supra note 122 (discussing United States’
efforts to combat racial discrimination).
158. Like the ICCPR, drafters of the CERD do not give any binding legal authority to
the CERD Committee. Rather, the CERD Committee’s role, as generally stated in Article 9,
Section 2, is to make "suggestions and general recommendations based on reports and
information received from the State Parties." CERD, supra note 22, at art. 9; see also
William F. Felice, The UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: Race, and Economic and Social Human Rights, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 205, 217
(2002) (stating that the CERD Committee’s function is not a judicial body but rather a
mechanism to guide states in their efforts to support their work toward integration of the
CERD and ameliorating discrimination).
159. See Felice, supra note 158, at 216–17 (discussing the United States’ failure to
achieve a standard of living called for by CERD).
160. See id. at 218 (discussing the CERD Committee’s past "flimsy and ineffectual
reports").
161. See id. at 217 (discussing non-judicial role of CERD).
162. See generally CERD, supra note 22, at arts. 11, 14, 22.
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Article 22.163 On an individual level, Article 14 provides redress to nonstate parties.164
Beginning with Article 11, state parties can submit complaints to
the CERD Committee against another state party for noncompliance
with the treaty.165 This option has never been used.166 Therefore, a state
party would likely not jeopardize its relations with the United States
over an internal U.S. citizenship policy.167
Article 22 provides a second option. It enables state parties to
submit claims to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).168 Similar to
Article 11, this option also remains problematic in application against
the United States. The problem stems from the United States’
reservation in Article 22, which requires its consent before a claim
proceeds to the ICJ. Unfortunately, the United States has never
consented to the use of Article 22, nor has any other state party.169
Although an Article 22 claim is still possible, reality dictates that its
success is unlikely. This is especially the case with internal U.S.
policies like the FBI name check delays.170

163. CERD, supra note 22, at arts. 11, 22 (granting state remedies).
164. CERD, supra note 22, at art. 14, para. 5 ("In the event of failure to obtain
satisfaction from the body established or indicated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this
article, the petitioner shall have the right to communicate the matter to the Committee within
six months.").
165. See CERD, supra note 22, at art. 11 (discussing state reporting options).
166. There is no record in any official or unofficial report of any state party to the
CERD using Article 11.
167. See International Convention Hearing, supra note 148, at 15 (discussing
citizenship policy). CERD Articles 12 and 13 are attached to this provision and set forth the
outline for determining how the CERD Committee and the United Nations would approach
this situation if a claim ever arose. CERD, supra note 22, at arts. 12, 13.
168. See CERD, supra note 22, at art. 22 (allowing interpretation or application
questions to be appealed to International Court of Justice).
169. See International Convention Hearing, supra note 147, at 14–15 (denoting Conrad
K. Harper, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State’s comment that the Clinton Administration
"strongly supports" use of international dispute mechanisms but for prudence and for
practicality rationales, Advisor Harper stressed that the best course of action is to set in place
a layer of protection to shield it from frivolous or politically motivated attacks by other
countries).
170. See FBI, National Name Check Program—Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.fbi.gov/page2/nationalnamecheck.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) (explaining the
National Name Check Program) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
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Finally, Article 14 provides the only enforcement and redress
procedure for individuals.171 It requires a state party’s consent before a
case can advance.172 If the state party does not consent, no further relief
exists.173 The United States has not consented to this Article; therefore,
it remains an ineffective redress option.174 In sum, CERD enforcement
mechanisms in Article 11, Article 22, and Article 14 prove useless
against the United States for FBI name check delays.
VI. Domestic Applications and Enforcement of the ICCPR and the CERD
On the domestic stage, it is nearly impossible to advance FBI name
check delay discrimination claims under the ICCPR or the CERD. This
Part explains why by analyzing the challenges associated with two
hurdles resurrected by the United States. The first section of this Part
addresses how federal courts treat the non-self-executing declarations
operating within both treaties.175 The second section of this Part
explores the plenary power doctrine and the deference federal courts
give to the United States on immigration issues.176 Finally, this Part
concludes by arguing that redress under either treaty is unlikely now or
in the future.177
A. The Non-self-execution Hurdle
At the outset, the United States believes that existing domestic laws
provide sufficient protection against discrimination for citizens and for
171. See CERD, supra note 22, at art. 14 (discussing the possible redress option for
individuals).
172. See id. at art. 14, para. 1 ("No communication shall be received by the Committee
if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration.").
173. See id. ("A State Party may at any time declare that it recognizes the competence
of the Committee to receive and consider communications from individuals or groups of
individuals within its jurisdiction claiming to be victims of a violation by that State Party of
any of the rights set forth in this Convention. No communication shall be received by the
Committee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration.").
174. See Felice, supra note 157, at 215–16 (noting that in Advisor Conrad’s speech he
explained that the United States never consented to this provision and therefore it cannot be
bound by it).
175. Infra Part VI.A.
176. Infra Part VI.B.
177. Infra Part VI.C.
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non-citizens.178 Accordingly, the Senate ratified the ICCPR and the
CERD as non-self-executing to prevent international treaty claims from
conflicting with domestic laws.179 The Supreme Court has upheld this
non-self-execution doctrine consistently for more than 150 years.
Recently in 2008, the Supreme Court renewed its commitment to this
doctrine in Medellín v. Texas.180 In Medellín, the majority stressed that
the "long recognized" distinction given to non-self-executing
international treaties is that it has no effect in the United States without
a congressional statute.181 The Court reasoned that the objective of nonself-execution is political, not judicial.182 Congress must pass legislation
before a treaty becomes "a rule for the Court."183 With no legislation

178. See Senate Report, supra note 56, at 22–26 (discussing and explaining this issue).
For example, the Senate Report clarified that because the ICCPR was a non-self-executing
treaty, it "would not . . . become directly enforceable as United States law in U.S. courts."
Marian Nash, U.S. Practice: Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 719, 726 (1994). Moreover, the Senate Report also
noted that the "U.S. already provides extensive protections and remedies against racial
discrimination sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the present convention." Id. Finally,
the Senate Report also noted:
For reasons of prudence, we recommend including a declaration that the
substantive provisions of the Covenant are not self-executing. The intent is to
clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in U.S. Courts.
As was the case with the Torture Convention, existing U.S. law generally
complies with the Covenant; hence, implementing legislation is not
contemplated.
Senate Report, 31 I.L.M. at 656.
179. See id. (stating that non-self-executing treaties "would not . . . become directly
enforceable as United States law in U.S. courts").
180. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (discussing this long-standing
precedent). Moreover, writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts upheld the doctrine of
non-self-executing provisions within international treaties and he further explained that it is
not binding on federal and state courts. In support of this holding, the Medellín Court cited
to the Court’s finding in Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 315 (1829) that a non-self-executing
treaty was not binding. Id. See generally United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833);
and Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1988).
181. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 504–05.
182. See id. at 508 (noting that a non-self-executing treaty created an obligation for the
political branches to take action to comply with the United States’ commitments and it was
not directly enforceable as federal law).
183. See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 516 (stating "[t]he point of a non-self-executing treaty is
that it ‘addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature must
execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court’" (quoting Foster v. Neilson,
27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829))).
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passed pertaining to the ICCPR or the CERD, a plaintiff would find it
nearly impossible to circumvent the non-self-executing hurdle.184
B. The Nonexistent CERD Claim and the Rare ICCPR Claim
Yet, there are always exceptions within every legal system. Although
no exceptional cases have advanced when brought under the CERD, some
isolated cases have advanced under the ICCPR. But those cases did not
make it far, as demonstrated by three lines of reasoning below.
One line of reasoning comes from Article 50. It states that the ICCPR
"extend[s] to all parts of the federal states without any limitations or
exceptions."185 Beazley v. Johnson186 illustrates a failed attempt at using
Article 50.187 There, the plaintiff argued that the United States consented to
Article 50 through ratification of the ICCPR, and therefore the United
States was bound by this provision.188 The court described that reasoning
as "nonsensical, to say the very least."189 The court subsequently dismissed
the claim that certain articles would supersede the Senate’s non-selfexecuting provision to the ICCPR.190
A second line of reasoning claims the ICCPR is self-executing (instead
of non-self-executing). This claim is also meritless as the Fifth Circuit’s
holding in Beazley also illustrates.191 According to the court, this claim
would never make it far because there is no case law to support such an
obscure contention.192
A third line of reasoning relies on the HRC’s non-binding
interpretation of United States’ obligations under the ICCPR. In Beazely,
184. As of February 17, 2009, Congress has not passed legislation extending rights
under the ICCPR or the CERD.
185. ICCPR, supra note 21, at art. 50.
186. See Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 573
(2002) (finding that a violation of the Vienna Convention did not dismiss the defendant’s
indictment).
187. See id.
188. See id. at 267 ("Beazley claims that this declaration is trumped by article 50.").
189. Id.
190. See id. at 266 ("[I]n Domingues v. Nevada, the Supreme Court of Nevada
concluded that ‘the Senate’s express reservation of the United States’ right to impose a
penalty of death on juvenile offenders negate[d] Domingues’ claim that he was illegally
sentenced’ . . . . We agree. " (citing Domingues v. Nevada, 114 Nev. 783, 785 (1998))).
191. See id. (rejecting the conclusion that provisions of the ICCPR voided state law).
192. See id. at 267 (denoting the court’s overall reasoning in dismissing petitioner’s
claim).
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the petitioner claimed that U.S. obligations should be determined by the
HRC and not by the United States’ non-self-executing doctrine.193 The trial
court found that this approach was procedurally barred and without merit.194
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit also dismissed this reasoning. It cited a lack of
supporting authority.195 Regardless of this exceptional application, most
federal courts continue deferring to the United States through the non-selfexecution doctrine.196
C. Immigration Plenary Power Preclusion
The federal courts also defer to immigration laws and policies
established by Congress and the Executive Branch. This section explains
how this deference impacts a possible ICCPR or CERD claim citing
discrimination from FBI name check delays. Finally, this section elaborates
on state parties and individual’s lack of success in challenging this
deference.
When the Senate originally crafted the RUDs for the ICCPR, it
explained that "U.S. laws permit additional distinctions . . . between
citizens and non-citizens and between different categories of non-citizens,
especially in the context of the immigration laws."197 This statement
193. Id. at 264.
194. Id. at 268.
195. See id. at 267 (dismissing petitioner’s contention that other courts have found
"persuasive" the HRC’s interpretation of a State Party’s adherence to the Covenant under
Article 41). The court found instead that the case law asserted by petitioner demonstrated
that courts could only use the HRC as a guide, not to void U.S. RUDs. Id. The Fifth Circuit
relied on several cases in its analysis, including: United States v. Bakeas, 987 F. Supp. 2d
44, 46 & n.4 (D. Mass. 1997) (noting that in this case the dictum of the Massachusetts
District Court must be dismissed because the only authority cited by that court was a law
review article in its contention that the HRC has the "ultimate authority to decide whether
parties’ classifications or reservations have any effect"); United States v. Duarte-Acero, 208
F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2000) (perceiving the HRC interpretation of the ICCPR as "most
important"); and United States v. Benitez, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1361, 1364 (S.D. Fla. 1998)
(noting interpretation of the HRC as merely "helpful").
196. See Beazley, 242 F.3d at 265–67 (rejecting language from the Human Rights
Committee stating that making a reservation to the execution of children provision would
nullify the treaty); General Comment 24, General Comment on Issues Relating to
Reservations Made upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional
Protocols Thereto, or in Relation to Declarations Under Article 41 of the Covenant, paras. 5,
6, 8, 18, U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm., 52d Sess., paras. 5, 6, 8, 18, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 1994) (finding that a reservation as to the provision on the
execution of children would render the entire treaty void).
197. United States: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report on the International
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reinforces the long-standing plenary power doctrine. Since 1889, the
Supreme Court has given "extreme deference" to Congress and to the
Executive Branch on the creation and enforcement of immigration laws.198
This deference leads federal courts to consistently decline the use of
heightened scrutiny. Most courts rely instead on the less stringent rational
basis standard of review.199
To date, federal courts rely on the plenary powers doctrine to dismiss
most FBI name check delay claims.200 Dismissal of these cases is due to
the United States’ ability to withstand a rational basis standard of review.
A subsidiary reason involves the dismissal of claims made by non-citizens
under the equal rights provisions of the Fifth Amendment.201 The rational
basis standard of review also places a significant burden on the plaintiff to
overcome the U.S. government’s national security rationale.202
In addition, federal courts frequently use a rational basis test for FBI
name check delay claims.203 As one federal court described, the focus on
FBI name checks is not on deciding whether it is good policy, but is instead
on deciding whether the policy is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest.204 Moreover, federal courts also reinforce that it is
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 31 I.L.M. 645, 655 (1992) (emphasis added).
198. See generally Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (finding that
treaties did not infringe on Congress’ power to regulate Chinese immigration); Shaughnessy
v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (finding that the Court should not second guess Congress’
legislative acts on immigration and the Executive’s methods of enforcing those acts);
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1951) (finding that the Court should defer to
Congress’ judgment in regulating immigration regarding the Alien Registration Act).
199. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 (1977) (stating that this Court has "long
recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute
exercised by the Government’s political departments largely immune from judicial control").
200. See Recent Mandamus Litigation, supra note 12 (providing a comprehensive upto-date list of all recent actions by federal courts regarding FBI name check delay cases
nationwide).
201. See, e.g., Antonishin v. Keisler, 627 F. Supp. 2d 872, 883 (N.D. Ill. 2007)
(explaining that in this case in which the plaintiff claimed Fifth Amendment violations from
USCIS delays, there existed no suspect class or otherwise fundamental right; therefore a
rational basis test would be used). Note that Antonishin reinforced its reasoning by citing to
Vision Church v. Village of Long Grove, 468 F.3d 975, 1000–01 (7th Cir. 2006). See also
Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).
202. See id. (noting the significant level of deference rational basis review grants to
"legislative determinations").
203. See Recent Mandamus Litigation, supra note 12 (highlighting a string of cases
using this standard of review).
204. See Antonishin, 627 F. Supp. 2d at 882–83 (noting that the rational basis standard
used in this context would be "extremely respectful" to the Immigration and Naturalization
Act and the plaintiff would have to find evidence that the statute draws a distinction that
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unlikely that the Immigration and Naturalization Act would ever be struck
down for FBI name check delays. FBI name check procedures provide a
legitimate government interest in safeguarding the United States.205
VII. Conclusion
In 2007, the USCIS experienced the most dramatic increase in
naturalization applications ever.206 The unexpected surge overwhelmed an
already burdened process and further highlighted significant flaws and
offsetting effects of this policy.207 One specific effect was a further
increase in the processing periods due to FBI name checks for many
believed to be of Muslim, Arab, Middle Eastern, or South Asian descent.208
As the NYU Report documented, the processing delays experienced by
many of these applicants are perceived by many to be both unnecessary and
extremely detrimental on a personal level.209
The USCIS has continued to assert that all naturalization applicants go
through the same screening process regardless of their race, ethnicity or
national origin since the 2002 inception of FBI name check procedures to
the naturalization process.210 For most applicants, delays associated with
this name check process never create an issue;211 but for a small percentage,
simply makes no sense).
205. See id. at 884 ("We do not believe that the presence of an applicant’s name in an
FBI file is so unlikely to reveal derogatory information that the records search is
irrational."); see also Omeiri v. District Director, Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration,
2007 WL 2121998, at *3 (E.D. Mich. 2007) (stating that "[t]he purpose of the background
checks within context of the Immigration and Naturalization Act is to ensure that only
worthy applicants are granted the privilege of United States citizenship").
206. Naturalization Delays: Causes, Consequences and Solutions, Before the S. Comm.
on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security, and International Law, 110th Cong.
2, 7 (2008) (statement of Emilio T. Gonzalez, Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services).
207. See id. at 2–9.
208. See generally supra note 6 and accompanying references.
209. See NYU REPORT, supra note 15, at 2–8 (noting this general theme throughout the
NYU Report and further documenting specific quotations from the personal effects this
policy had on naturalization applicants).
210. U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT
SHEET: IMMIGRATION SECURITY CHECKS—HOW AND WHY THE PROCESS WORKS 2 (2006),
http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/security_checks_42506.pdf.
211. See id. at 2 (stating that of the total pool of naturalization applications, in 80% of
the cases there are no FBI name check matches resulting in delays; and of the remaining
20%, most of the cases are usually resolved within 6 months. And further, "Less than one
percent of cases subject to an FBI name check remain pending longer than six months").
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it has produced a substantially longer processing time.212 While the USCIS
acknowledges this impact of the name check requirement, it maintains that
it will not "forsake integrity and sound decision making in favor of
increased productivity, or compromise national security."213
Conceding that the FBI name check requirement has produced
substantial personal difficulties for many applicants does not in itself justify
condemnation of this requirement. It does, however, necessitate a careful
analysis of the costs and benefits associated with the existing process, with
a particular emphasis on the apparent disparate impact on certain groups of
applicants. This Note contributes to such analysis by identifying and
applying the correct international human rights framework to analyze the
United States’ treaty obligations.214
Despite the important criticisms contained in the NYU Report, this
Note concludes that delays caused by the FBI name check process do not
place the United States in violation of its international obligations under the
ICCPR or the CERD, nor do these treaties provide any form of meaningful
redress for applicants subjected to prolonged processing time. These
conclusions are based primarily on the United States’ RUDs to each treaty
and the effects they have on the United States’ international obligations,
which were the precise considerations omitted from the NYU Report’s
analysis.215 Factoring these RUDs into the equation indicates the ultimate
permissibility of the current U.S. naturalization policies.
Of course, concluding that human rights treaties do not provide a
meaningful check on the establishment and the implementation of this
immigration policy does not indicate that it is wise or even morally
legitimate. Legality does not necessarily eliminate compelling policy
reasons to reconsider the name check requirement in light of the
212. Id.
213. Naturalization Delays, supra note 205, at 6.
214. In presenting the foregoing analysis, it is imperative to reinforce that the goal of
this Note is not in any way to discredit nor disrespect the individuals affected by the FBI
name check delays. Nor is this scholarship meant to in any way discredit the excellent work
done by the NYU Center for Human Rights and Global Justice on bringing this issue to
forefront of the immigration discussion.
215. NYU REPORT, supra note 15, at 25–30 (arguing that the United States’ actions
violate international law). The NYU Report does not mention the United States’
reservations, declarations, or understandings to the ICCPR or the CERD in reaching its
conclusion on the United States’ treaty violations; see also infra Part I (explaining that the
underpinning behind the United States’ use of RUDs is a compromising mechanism that
enables ratification of HRTs while keeping intact the domestic rights structure under the
U.S. Constitution. It also briefly discusses why the United States’ RUDs to HRTs would
likely not place the FBI name check delays in direct violation of international obligations).
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unanticipated impact produced by the attendant delays in naturalization
processing. However, recent evidence indicates that this impact is
becoming less problematic: in June 2009, the USCIS and the FBI
announced that they had met their goal of eliminating the naturalization
backlog, hired additional personnel, and refined the name check criteria to
ensure that ninety-eight percent of all name check requests were completed
within thirty days, and the other two percent within ninety days.216 These
developments offer the potential to better align law, policy, and moral
imperatives, an outcome that should be considered worthwhile by all critics
of the immigration process.

216. Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., USCIS, FBI Eliminate National Name Check Backlog (June 22, 2009),
http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/NNCP_backlog_elim_22jun09.pdf.

